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Abstract. Methods and insights from statistical physics are finding an increasing variety of applications
where one seeks to understand the emergent properties of a complex interacting system. One such area
concerns the dynamics of language at a variety of levels of description, from the behaviour of individual
agents learning simple artificial languages from each other, up to changes in the structure of languages
shared by large groups of speakers over historical timescales. In this Colloquium, we survey a hierarchy
of scales at which language and linguistic behaviour can be described, along with the main progress in
understanding that has been made at each of them—much of which has come from the statistical physics
community. We argue that future developments may arise by linking the different levels of the hierarchy
together in a more coherent fashion, in particular where this allows more effective use of rich empirical
data sets.
PACS. 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 02.50.Ey Stochastic processes – 87.19.lv Learning and
memory
1 Introduction
In 1972, Anderson famously articulated the idea that
“more is different” [1]: that the emergent consequence of
fundamental physical laws at one scale lead to new physi-
cal laws at a larger scale, and ones that are as fundamental
as those that apply at the smaller scale. In physics, statis-
tical mechanics provides the conceptual and methodolog-
ical framework to build the bridge between the dynamics
at the larger scale and the interactions between the con-
stituents at the smaller scale.
A good illustration of this procedure is provided by the
two steps of coarse-graining that sit between the classical
Hamiltonian dynamics of point particles and the Navier-
Stokes equations for fluids. The first step is to shift from a
description in terms of individual particles to one in terms
of classes of particles, for example, all those at a similar
point in space and with a similar velocity (see e.g. [2]).
This trick, pioneered by Maxwell to determine the equi-
librium distribution of particle velocities [3], reduces the
dimensionality of the problem by a factor of N , the num-
ber of particles in the system. Since N is extremely large
(order 1023 or more) for macroscopic systems, this is an
impressive reduction in complexity. However it comes at
a cost: the full dynamics take the form of an infinite hi-
erarchy of equations, each of which requires a solution for
all of the others in order to be solved. To break this vi-
cious circle, a physical insight is needed. Specifically, the
molecular chaos assumption (employed by both Maxwell
[3] and Boltzmann [4] with varying degrees of explicitness)
amounts to a statement that the details of collisions be-
tween particles is less important than their overall effect,
which is taken to eliminate correlations between pairs of
particles. The Boltzmann equation that results is a non-
linear equation that describes the population dynamics of
particles and their movements between different classes.
A further step of averaging yields coarse-grained density
and velocity fields. Again, this step generates a hierar-
chy of equations which can be truncated by appealing to
a physical insight, namely that the macroscopic fields of
interest vary slowly on the length- and timescales of the
microscopic particle dynamics [5]. We thus arrive at the
Navier-Stokes equation, which is highly nonlinear and can
describe extremely rich physical states, such as turbulence,
whose existence is unimaginable in the original Hamilto-
nian formulation.
The fact that Hamiltonian equations of motion lie at
the bottom of this hierarchy is incidental to the statistical
mechanical coarse-graining procedure. The crucial com-
ponent is the physical insight that allows certain aspects
of the dynamics at one level of the hierarchy to be re-
placed with an effective description that makes progress
towards understanding the next level possible. There is no
reason that such insights should be the preserve of con-
densed matter physics. Indeed, Anderson’s hierarchy ex-
tended from particle physics to the social sciences, pass-
ing through cell biology and psychology on the way. It
should therefore come as no surprise—nor concern—that
the reach of statistical physics has profitably expanded
into the biological [6,7] and sociological [8] domains. Fur-
thermore, in line with Anderson’s position, exploring these
applications areas often raises new fundamental questions
in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics.
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One area that has received growing attention from sta-
tistical physicists over the past fifteen years or so is the
quest for a quantitative understanding of language dy-
namics. Human language exhibits complexity at multiple
scales in at least two dimensions. First, language itself ex-
hibits complex structure at the level of sounds, words and
sentences through phonology (which specifies how sounds
may be be combined), morphology (how meaningful com-
binations of sounds may be further combined to make
words) and syntax (how sentences are formed) [9]. At each
level, the specific set of valid combinations varies from one
language to the next: for example, the order with which
words with a specific function appear in a sentence is not
the same in every language (as we will discuss further
in Section 2 below). At the same time, variation is not
completely arbitrary: for example, some word orders are
more common across the world’s languages than others.
Meanwhile, each language changes over time at all levels of
organisation, leading on occasion to predictable phenom-
ena like vowel shifts [10] and the unidirectional charac-
ter of grammaticalisation [11], whereby words with more
concrete meanings (like objects and actions, represented
by nouns and verbs) take on more abstract grammatical
functions (like relationships between objects, represented
by prepositions) over time, whilst the reverse process is
extremely rare [12].
It is natural to assume that the process of language
change is related to the variation that is observed be-
tween human languages. This leads to the second dimen-
sion of linguistic complexity, in that a language is a col-
lective phenomenon, shared by a group of speakers, and
that originates from interactions between individual mem-
bers of this group (whose membership may also change
over time). It is this dimension that has been of particu-
lar interest to statistical physicists, since it concerns the
question of how the properties of the system at large can
be understood from the behaviour of the component parts.
This complex systems approach also has a long tradition in
linguistics, its essence being captured by the usage-based
model [13] and leading to a view of language as a complex
adaptive system articulated by various authors [14,15].
In this short Colloquium I focus more or less exclu-
sively on this second social dimension, and in particular
on the processes by which languages change and thereby
differentiate themselves from one another over time, whilst
retaining certain features in common. Empirical, experi-
mental and modelling work in this area typically employs
rather simple representations of language, for example,
competition between two competing words with the same
meaning, thereby abstracting away much of the structural
complexity described above. However it is important to
keep in mind that this structural complexity exists, and
we will briefly return to the question of how to build on the
framework set out in this Colloquium to incorporate more
sophisticated language structure (and why this would be
worthwhile) in the concluding section.
Within this perspective of language as a dynamical ob-
ject undergoing a process of cultural evolution through in-
teractions between individual speakers endowed with cer-
tain cognitive and behavioural capabilities, we can identify
four levels of a hierarchy that we discuss in separate sec-
tions of this article. We begin in Section 2 with the largest
length- and timescales, where language is viewed as a char-
acterising a group of speakers and undergoes change in its
own right without direct reference to the behaviour of its
users. In Section 3, individual speakers enter the picture as
agents adopting one (or more) of a number of pre-existing
languages, thereby causing the prevalence of different lan-
guages to change over time. Section 4 shifts focus from
language as a whole to individual utterances, and in par-
ticular the process by which an innovative feature initially
used by a small number of speakers can propagate through
the entire community of language users, precipitating a
change in its macroscopic state. Finally, in Section 5 we
survey (mostly experimental) work that seeks to estab-
lish the cognitive and behavioural biases that underpins
the linguistic behaviour of individual speakers and that
are ultimately responsible for the processes that occur at
higher levels of the hierarchy.
By taking a view of language as a primarily cultural
evolutionary phenomenon, emerging in systems of agents
with the necessary linguistic capabilities, the question of
how these capabilities arise in the first place is largely ex-
cluded from our discussion. This is nevertheless a large,
active and highly multi-disciplinary field of enquiry in its
own right, and the interested reader is referred elsewhere
[16–18] for an overview of research in this area. We add
however the cautionary note that the field of language ori-
gins is not without its controversies, particularly on the
question on what biological adaptations have occurred—
if any—that are specific to language (see e.g. [19,20] for
contrasting views on this topic). Nevertheless, the hierar-
chy we have set out here could in principle be extended to
longer timescales and to the coevolution of cultural and
biological evolution, thereby potentially shedding light on
some of these issues. We touch on such possibilities in the
concluding section.
Even within the restricted range of topics covered here,
space precludes detailed discussion of all the relevant lit-
erature. The main focus is therefore on a relatively small
number of studies, each of which exemplifies a particular
paradigm within the field of language dynamics. Although
the cited references should serve as an entry-point to the
wider literature, references to relevant review articles that
go into more depth on specific topic are provided at ap-
propriate points.
2 Variation in language structure
As noted above, languages vary in their structure at all
levels of organisation. A useful resource for studying sim-
ilarities and differences between languages is the World
Atlas of Language Structure (WALS, [21]) which speci-
fies up to 192 features (for example, the size of the conso-
nant inventory or the number of genders) across over 1000
languages. This database reinforces the findings of typo-
logical research [22] that whilst considerable variation is
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evident in the structure of different languages, this varia-
tion is not unconstrained. An illustrative example is basic
word order, which concerns the order that the subject (S),
object (O) and verb (V) appear in a sentence. Although
all six orderings would convey the same information, the
two patterns that have the subject in the first position
characterise around 90% of the languages in WALS. This
highly nonuniform distribution over the possible states of
a language is referred to as a typological universal. More
sophisticated universals also exist [22], in particular impli-
cational universals, whereby the presence of one structure
in a language tends to imply another structure: for exam-
ple, if adjectives precede nouns, it is very likely (around
90% probability) that demonstratives also precede nouns
[21].
At the largest length and timescales we can think of
each language as a single coherent unit, and defined in
terms of some set of F features. For simplicity, let each of
these features be discrete such that feature f takes one of
mf distinct values, denoted σf . For example, in the case of
basic word order, σf takes one of six values. At this level
of description, the state of a language is fully specified by
the vector σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σF ). The first type of typolog-
ical universal then corresponds a nonuniform distribution
over the set of possible states {σ}, while implicational uni-
versals correspond to correlations between components of
the vector σ. In this framework, one can postulate (at
least) two possible explanations for these typological uni-
versals. The first is that some states σ are more stable
than others: for example, languages that place the sub-
ject first are less likely to change than those that have
it in a different position. The second is to acknowledge
that (like species) languages may have common ancestors
(for example, French and Romanian are descendants of
Latin), and hence correlations between the states of dif-
ferent languages can be attributed to a common historical
period. The main method to discriminate such explana-
tions is phylogenetic analysis (see e.g. [23] for a review in
the context of cultural evolution).
The basic idea is to assume first of all that the histori-
cal evolution of languages can be modelled as a tree within
which branches occur at points in time where an ancestor
language splits into two daughters—see Figure 1. On top
of this tree structure, a stochastic model for the changes in
state that occur is superimposed. In linguistics, this type
of model has been referred to as a state-process model and
is attributed to Greenberg [24]. A natural choice for the
stochastic dynamics is a time-homogeneous Poisson pro-
cess wherein the probability that a language in state σ
changes to state σ′ in a time interval dt is
Pdt(σ
′|σ; t) = ω(σ′|σ)dt , (1)
i.e., that the rate of change from one state to another
is constant in time across all branches of the tree. Sam-
pling from this distribution gives a set of points at which
changes in state occurred, shown as circles on the branches
in Figure 1. From the stochastic model for changes in
state, one can compute the likelihood of arriving at the
current distribution of languages (given a common an-
cestor and specific tree structure). Then, using Bayesian
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Fig. 1. A tree relating languages with different structures.
New languages are created when an ancestor splits into two
daughters. Changes in state occur at points in time marked
with a filled circle. This gives rise to a set of distinct languages,
σ1, . . . , σ9, at the present time that are all descended from the
common language σ0.
statistics, one can infer a posterior distribution of the pa-
rameters in the model, which includes the tree structure
and the transition rates between language states. It is also
possible to incorporate further constraints where informa-
tion is known, for example, points in history where a lan-
guage split occurred.
Since sampling the full parameter space to obtain pos-
terior distributions is computationally demanding, it is
only recently that these methods have become widely-
used. Prior to this, other methods—such as maximum par-
simony methods—were used to infer the relationships be-
tween different languages [25]. In this context, maximum
parsimony typically corresponds to finding the shortest
evolutionary pathways between different languages, for ex-
ample, the sequence of events with the smallest number
of changes in state over the entire history. Initial stud-
ies [25,26] focussed on the lexicon (i.e., the set of words
available to speakers to express meanings). The idea is
the closely-related languages have more words in common
than distantly-related languages. More formally, one can
define cognate sets that comprise words from different lan-
guages that are judged to have the same form for the same
meaning [9]. In this context, each feature f corresponds
to one of the cognate sets, and σf = 0 or 1 depending
on whether the language in question appears in cognate
set f . A change in state then corresponds to a language
entering or leaving a cognate set.
One obvious question is whether it is reasonable to
assume that relationships between languages form a tree-
like structure, as in Figure 1. Evidence in favour of this
assumption was provided by Gray et al [25]: the most
parsimonious tree was more consistent with an ‘express-
train’ hypothesis where languages were established during
a rapid process of colonisation of successive ‘stations’ in
the Pacific by Austronesian-speaking populations, as op-
posed to an ‘entangled bank’ hypothesis characterised by
a high degree of contact between the different languages.
More recent work has moved in two parallel directions.
One is that described above, that is, to incorporate explicit
stochastic models of language change processes, and to
use Bayesian statistics as a means to estimate parameters
that characterise the dynamics. The second direction is to
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employ more sophisticated measures of distance between
two languages (such as the relative entropy [27] or Leven-
shtein distance [28] between two sets of words in different
languages with the same meaning) and use variations on
the maximum parsimony approach to determine likely tree
structures. In principle, both approaches could be com-
bined; however this is not yet widely practised, presum-
ably because more sophisticated notions of language struc-
ture translate to correspondingly more complex stochastic
dynamical models.
Taken together, these complementary investigations
have delivered a wide variety of findings, a few of which
we touch on here. First, they provide support for the the-
ory that Indo-European languages originated in Anatolia
around 8,000–9,500 years ago [26,29] and that inferences
based on the structure of the sound system, word order
and other grammatical features allows reconstruction to
greater time depths than is possible with the lexicon, and
specifically that Papuan languages diverged over 10,000
years ago [30]. Using the dynamical approach, the rate of
lexical change has been estimated to vary by up to two
orders of magnitude, and to be correlated with the fre-
quency of word use [31] and population size [32]. In both
cases the data are suggestive of a power-law dependence
of the rate on the explanatory variable. A power law rela-
tionship between the rate of verb regularisation and verb
frequency was also found from a corpus of English texts
[33]. Here, however, the statistical physicist will likely be
disappointed that the exponents of the power laws relating
the rate of language change to the frequencies of different
linguistic units are not the same: this suggests that the
underlying mechanisms generating these mechanisms may
not be universal—at least in a strict statistical physics
sense.
Most relevant to questions about the origin of typolog-
ical universals, and in particular the question of whether
more common structures are also more stable, are two
studies of word-order universals [34,35]. Of these two stud-
ies, that of Maurits and Griffiths [35] is conceptually more
straightforward. Here, the authors find that despite SOV
word order being slightly more common than SVO order
in the contemporary distribution of languages (at 48% and
41% respectively [21]), the historical rates of change be-
tween the two orders are indistinguishable, suggesting that
they are in fact of equal stability. Dunn et al [34] mean-
while investigate the more subtle question of implicational
universals. Here, the hypothesis is that if the orders of two
word classes (say adjective-noun and demonstrative-noun)
are found to be correlated in the contemporary distribu-
tion, one would expect to see a similar correlation in the
historical rates of change of these two structures. Only
two of the correlations expected from the contemporary
distribution were observed in the historical dynamics of
more than one language family. Furthermore, most of the
dynamical correlations that were identified were present
in a single language family.
This latter result suggests that factors specific to indi-
vidual cultures contribute to the dynamics that give rise
to typological universals. However, at this level of de-
scription, it does not pinpoint what these factors might
be. Some clues are provided by investigations of corre-
lations between language structures and quantities that
vary between cultures: of these, two studies [36,37] have
been particularly prominent—in part due to a degree of
controversy. Dediu and Ladd [36] presented evidence that
two genes related to brain structure potentially contribute
towards a cognitive bias that disfavours linguistic tone
(the use of pitch to distinguish words) in the process of
language acquisition. Meanwhile, Lupyan and Dale [37]
demonstrated an inverse relationship between language
size (as measured number of speakers or geographical
area) and structural complexity across 28 distinct fea-
tures (e.g., the number of cases): in other words, that
more widely-spoken languages tend to be less complex.
Further clues might emerge by appealing to the dynamics
of language at a lower level of description.
3 Languages competing for speech
communities
The model of language in the previous section made ex-
plicit reference only to its structure (as defined by a set
of features). Any influence of the underlying population
of speakers was incorporated at best implicitly, for exam-
ple, by allowing the transition rates between states to de-
pend on culture-specific factors like its size (as was done in
[32]). In all of these studies, interactions between distinct
languages, other than the possibility that they share an
ancestor, were ignored. By descending a level into the hi-
erarchy, we can investigate interactions between languages
mediated by the groups of speakers using them. Note that
in order to distinguish from any other social groups (e.g.,
populations of a country) we shall use the term speech
community (borrowed from linguistics) to describe a so-
cial group with a common language.
The obvious example of an interaction between two or
more languages is where they are spoken in the same geo-
graphical area, and thereby compete for a common pool of
speakers. The Celtic languages (Welsh, Scottish and Irish
Gaelic, Cornish and Manx) that spoken alongside English
within the British Isles provide an example of such a set
[38]. The increasing dominance of English over the Celtic
languages—to the extent of extinction in the case of Cor-
nish and Marx—is evidence of competition between them
that is independent of the population dynamics in the rel-
evant regions, since neither region suffered a mass popula-
tion extinction in the relevant historical period. Rather it
is the process of language shift, whereby individual speak-
ers switch from one language to another through a variety
of mechanisms [39], that is believed to explain such de-
clines.
A seminal model of language shift was proposed by
Abrams and Strogatz [40]. It is couched in terms of the
fractions x and y = 1 − x of a population speaking two
languages X and Y respectively. The fraction of speakers
who shift from Y to X per unit time is denoted PYX and
is taken to depend on the size, x, of speech community of
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X and a quantity 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 that encodes the ‘status’ of X.
The status of Y is given implicitly by 1− s, so for s > 12 ,
X has a higher status than Y. Ignoring all fluctuations,
one arrives at an ordinary differential equation for x of
the form
dx
dt
= yPYX(x, s)− xPXY(x, s) . (2)
The transition rates PYX(x, s) and PYX(x, s) are not inde-
pendent. If the size and status of a language are the only
factors that affect the competition between them, we must
obtain the same dynamics under relabelling of X and Y.
This implies that PXY(x, s) = PYX(1−x, 1−s). Under the
further mild assumptions that (i) languages with no speak-
ers are not spontaneously reinvented; (ii) that a language
with zero status is never shifted towards; and (iii) that
PY X(x, s) increases monotonically in both arguments, the
fixed points of (2) can be determined. One finds that there
are always two stable fixed points at x = 0 and x = 1, cor-
responding to extinction of X and Y respectively, and a
third fixed point that corresponds to coexistence of both
languages. This latter fixed point is always unstable, im-
plying that one of the two languages is doomed to extinc-
tion. Which of the two languages that is destined for this
fate depends on the initial condition.
Although extremely simple, this model provides a
number of valuable insights. First, Abrams and Strogatz
[40] showed that the model can be fit to time-series data
for a variety of languages. To achieve this, they chose the
form of the transition rate to be PYX(x, s) = csx
a, where
a, c and s are a set of parameters fit separately to each
linguistic time series (along with x(0)). The value of the
exponent a ≈ 1.3 was reported to be fairly robust across
the languages, although little was said about the remain-
ing parameters. Nevertheless, this appears to allow con-
fident prediction of the fate of a minority language, and
in particular the timescale over which extinction may be
expected. From a theoretical perspective, the most inter-
esting parameter in this model is s, the social status of
language X. The thinking here is that speakers have some
awareness of the opportunities afforded to them by their
choice of language, for example, to improve their own per-
sonal wealth. At this level of description, however, the pre-
cise mechanism by which this awareness is gained is left
unspecified.
The main value of Abrams and Strogatz’ model is the
limited range of outcomes it predicts under broad but rea-
sonable assumptions. In particular, the fact that coexis-
tence of two languages of different social status is impos-
sible in this framework has motivated many extensions of
the basic model, a number of which are reviewed in greater
depth elsewhere, e.g. [41,42]. There are at least two ways
in which two languages of unequal status can coexist. The
first is to assume that initially the languages are spoken in
different regions and only then mediate contact between
them by diffusion of speakers of one language into the geo-
graphical region in which the other was originally spoken
[43]. This mechanism works because Eq. (2) has stable
fixed points at x = 0 and x = 1, i.e., when either of the
two languages is the only one being spoken. This stability
implies a small incursion of speakers of the other language
can be tolerated. What is interesting about this result is
that demonstrates the possibility for a globally disfavoured
language (the one with the lower status) to survive along-
side the high-status language.
Is there any way in which two languages of different
status might coexist at the same point in space? This was
shown to be possible if one combines the process of lan-
guage shift in the Abrams-Strogatz model with a process
of reproduction that causes both the population size to
grow and for the offspring to inherit the language of its
parents [44]. In common with many other models of pop-
ulation growth, this model featured a carrying capacity
which limits the maximum size of the population [45].
However, in [44] a separate carrying capacity was assigned
to each speech community, meaning that when the region
is saturated by speakers of language X, it can nevertheless
continue to accommodate speakers of language Y. It turns
out that it is this assumption that facilitates coexistence.
If one instead assumes that the overall size of the com-
bined population, comprising both speech communities, is
limited by a carrying capacity, which is reasonable if they
compete for the same set of resources to sustain their pop-
ulation, the possibility of coexistence is removed [46]. It
is however possible to engineer coexistence if the relative
social status of the two languages is different in differ-
ent parts of space, which could plausibly arise because
ultimately the status is a subjective judgement made by
individual speakers, and consequently different groups of
speakers could reach different judgements. Taking the re-
sults from this body of research together, it seems that
the usual outcome of language competition is for a dom-
inant language to drive others to extinction, unless there
is some spatial symmetry-breaking present, either in the
initial condition or through variation of an external fac-
tor like social status. This generalisation also applies when
bilingualism is also incorporated into the Abrams-Strogatz
model [47], in the presence of noise [48] or both [49], al-
though long-lived metastable states in which both lan-
guages persist can been seen. The main departure from
this generalisation is found under external interventions
that are explicitly designed to prevent extinction of de-
clining languages, such as embedding them in the school
curriculum [47].
An empirical fact worth noting is that extinction of
one of the languages in contact is not the only possible
outcome. In certain instances, notably after colonisation
by Europeans of regions inhabited by speakers of a dif-
ferent language, a new language, known as a creole, can
form [50]. A sister project to the World Atlas of Language
Structures (WALS, [21]), known as the Atlas of Pidgin
and Creole Language Structures (APiCS, [51]), documents
the structural features of these languages formed through
contact. However, quantitative modelling of the forma-
tion process is as yet in its infancy. In this regard, a no-
table contribution [52] involves a stochastic model with
the flavour of the naming game (described in more detail
in the next section) quantitatively reproduced the empir-
ical finding that the European language tended to domi-
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nate when the fraction of Europeans in the population is
high, whilst at lower levels of colonisation a creole tends
to form.
4 Emergence of a common language
In the discussion so far, a language has been defined at the
speech community level, for example, as a set of structural
features that are characteristic of the language as a whole,
and help to differentiate it from languages spoken by dif-
ferent groups of people. Nevertheless, there is considerable
variation in the way language is used by speakers of the
same language. Indeed this variation exists both within
and between individual members of a speech community
[9,53,54]. In common with structural variation between
languages, this variation exists at all levels of linguistic
complexity: speakers can differ in the way they pronounce
the same word or a syllable that appears in a class of
words, in the word they use to convey a given meaning, or
in they way they construct sentences. This variation may
arise in a number of different ways [53]. For example, one
property of language is its open-endedness which confers
on speakers the ability to express propositions that they
have never articulated or heard before. This entails pro-
ducing new words or recombining words in a new way. At
the same time, speakers may adjust their set of grammat-
ical rules, perhaps to achieve greater internal consistency
of the system (e.g., by regularising an irregular verb). Al-
ternatively, words and phrases may enter one language by
borrowing from another (see, for example, the German
word ansatz that is widely used by physicists, and whose
precise meaning is hard to convey efficiently in English).
These innovations explain why some unconventional
forms may coexist alongside the conventional forms that
characterise a language at the speech community level.
However, these conventions also change over time, as we
have seen in Section 2. An important question relates to
the mechanism by which these innovations, which are cre-
ated in interactions between small numbers of agents, are
propagated and result in a change in a language’s macro-
scopic state. By now, this problem of conventionalisation
or consensus-formation is a very well-studied problem in
statistical physics, with progress having been very com-
prehensively reviewed fairly recently [8]. It is also worth
noting that the field of sociolinguistics is devoted to un-
derstanding variability in language use, the factors that
result in one variant form being used over another, and
how these factors contribute to language change [54].
In order to discuss this large body of work in a con-
sistent fashion, we shall adopt Croft’s evolutionary frame-
work for language change initially set out in [53]. This
identifies three distinct dynamical processes that con-
tribute. The first is replication, which is the reproduction
of structures (e.g., sounds, words or a particular ordering
of word classes in a sentence). The second is innovation,
which may take the form of a completely novel utterance
or (more likely) some small change to a structure as it is
replicated (e.g., putting words in a different order in or-
der to suggest a novel meaning to the listener). The third
process is selection, which is the preferential replication
of one structure over another. Later works [55,56] intro-
duce a distinction between two types of selection: interac-
tor selection, whereby certain individual members of the
speech community have a greater influence on a speaker’s
behaviour than others, and replicator selection, whereby
one structure is systematically replicated in preference to
another by a speaker or a group of speakers.
4.1 Paradigmatic models of consensus formation
Different aspects of the process of consensus formation
have resulted in models that combine innovation, replica-
tion and selection in a variety of different ways. We frame
the discussion with two paradigmatic and well-studied
models, namely the Moran model of replication dynam-
ics, originally formulated in the context of population ge-
netics but more recently co-opted for linguistic purposes,
and the naming name, which was inspired by experiments
in which robots perceive natural stimuli and attempt to
communicate with one another [57].
4.1.1 The Moran model of replication dynamics
The Moran model applies to a fixed-sized population of
N agents, each of whom can be in one of a number of
discrete states. The simplest case has just two states, A
and B, which in linguistic applications relate to speakers
who use different pronunciations of the same sound, dif-
ferent words for an object, or different grammatical rules
with the same function (e.g., marking the past tense). In
each elementary update of the Moran model, two agents
are chosen at random. One is designated as the speaker,
and the other as the listener. The speaker produces an
utterance that allows the listener to identify whether the
speaker is a user of variant A or variant B. As a result
of the interaction, the listener adopts the same variant as
that used by the speaker. The update rule is illustrated in
Figure 2.
The Moran model serves as a simple mathematical de-
scription of accommodation, a process where interacting
agents serve to align their linguistic behaviour [58]. In this
formulation it is implicit that each member of the speech
community uses either A or B categorically, and not some
variable mixture of the two, although the latter is in fact
commonplace in linguistics [54]. Also this model as for-
mulated has no spatial or social structure: every pair of
agents is equally likely to interact, and accommodation is
equally likely in either direction. Extensions to the Moran
model exist that incorporate variability in individual be-
haviour and in the interaction strengths between agents.
One of these is the utterance selection model, also illus-
trated in Figure 2. In this model, each individual speaker
is represented by a population of stored tokens of linguis-
tic behaviour. A pair of agents interacts with some prob-
ability Gij , whereupon they produce a set of tokens by
sampling from the store. This allows for individual speak-
ers to exhibit variable linguistic behaviour. After the in-
teraction, agent i stores tokens produced by speaker j in
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Moran Utterance Selection
hii
hij
Fig. 2. The Moran and utterance selection models of replication dynamics. In the Moran model, two agents are chosen at
random from the speech community. One (shown crossed-out) has its state replaced with a copy of another (shown light shaded).
The utterance selection model is defined in terms of units of linguistic variation, rather than agents. Each speech community
now represents a memory of linguistic events. In the figure, the left-most store is that of a speaker (agent i), and the right-most
store that of a listener (agent j). A set of (here two) tokens is sampled from the speaker’s store, shown intermediate between
the two stores. With probability hii, a copy of a produced token is placed in the speaker’s store, displacing an existing memory
in the process. With probability hij , a copy is stored in the listener’s store. In the original formulation of the utterance selection
model, both agents in an interacting pair act as speakers and listeners in each interaction. The dynamics (up to a factor of two
in the characteristic timescale) are the same.
their store with a probability proportional to hij ; agent j
does likewise with a probability proportional to hji. These
two probabilities need not be symmetric: hij 6= hji, which
then corresponds to the two speakers accommodating to
a different degree. In this way, interactor selection (social
biases) can be incorporated. As we will see below, many
insights from the Moran model can be used to understand
the behaviour of more complex models like the utterance
selection model.
4.1.2 The naming game
The naming game is a model in which agents maintain
an inventory of possible names for an object. In its first
appearance in the physics literature [59], the dynamics
were defined as follows. A speaker-listener pair is drawn
from a population of N agents at random, as in the Moran
model. The speaker chooses one of the names in its inven-
tory to present to the listener: if this inventory is empty,
the speaker invents its own idiosyncratic name for the ob-
ject and adds it to their inventory. The outcome of the
interaction is deemed a success if the listener also has the
uttered name in its inventory. In this case, any alternative
names in both the speaker and listeners’ inventories are
removed. Otherwise the interaction is a failure and the
listener adds the uttered name to the inventory. These
dynamics are illustrated in Figure 3.
Certain similarities with the Moran and utterance se-
lection models are evident, for example the random sam-
pling of agents from the population, and the random sam-
pling of stored tokens (words) from the store (inventory)
by the speaker. However, there are also a number of im-
portant differences. First, the inventory can accommodate
an arbitrary number of words for the object, whereas in
the utterance selection model the size of the store is fixed.
Second, an innovation process is built into the dynamics
from the outset, whereby agents invent a word for the ob-
ject when they do not have one. Finally, the deletion rule
oyb
fral
oyb cherv
Failure
oyb oyb
Success oyb
Speaker Listener
Fig. 3. The naming game. In this model, agents are equipped
with an expandable inventory of names for a single object.
When a pair of agents interact, the speaker samples a name
uniformly from their inventory (inventing a word if it is empty).
In both cases shown here, this inventory comprises the names
‘oyb’ and ‘fral’. The interaction is a failure if the listener’s
inventory does not contain the uttered word (here, ‘oyb’); in
this case it is expanded to include it. Otherwise the interaction
is a success, and both agents delete all alternative words (here,
‘fral’ and ‘cherv’) from their inventories.
introduces a bias into the replication process, whose na-
ture and significance will become apparent as we discuss
the effects of biases and selection mechanisms in a system-
atic way below. As with the utterance selection model,
one can place speakers in the naming game on a social
network, and vary the influence that certain individuals
have over others, thereby implementing interactor selec-
tion (see e.g., [60,61]). It is perhaps worth noting that
neither model described here implements replicator selec-
tion: all words or variants are considered to be equivalent
in terms of their communicative function.
4.2 Dynamics of consensus formation
Armed with this pair of paradigmatic models of consen-
sus formation, we now discuss how replication, innovation
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and selection interact to drive the emergence of shared
linguistic behaviour within a speech community.
4.2.1 Unbiased replication
Even the simple stochastic replication process described
by the Moran model, lacking innovation or any biases, is
sufficient to achieve consensus. This can be understood
from the stochastic equation of motion for this model,
which can be derived fairly straightforwardly [62]. First,
let x be the fraction of the N agents in the speech com-
munity who use variant A. In order for x to change in
one timestep, the speaker-listener pair must comprise one
A and one B user. Then x increases or decreases by 1/N
with equal probability. Consequently, the expected change
in x is zero, and the stochastic process is purely diffusive.
The rate of diffusion is obtained by examining the mean
square change in x per timestep: this is 2x(1−x)/N2. This
allows one to write down the Fokker-Planck equation [63]
∂
∂t
P (x, t) =
1
Λ(N)
∂2
∂x2
x(1− x)P (x, t) , (3)
where P (x, t) is the probability that a fraction x of the
speech community are users of A at time t given some
initial condition, and the timescale Λ(N) = N2 for the
Moran model. Formally, this equation is exact in the limit
N →∞ under rescaling of time τ = t/Λ(N).
The equation (3) is exactly solved for arbitrary initial
condition [64], and therefore its dynamics are very well un-
derstood. In particular it is known that eventually one of
the two variants that are initially present will go extinct
in a finite time. This is reminiscent of the Abrams and
Strogatz’ result for language competition, which showed
that one of the competing languages is destined for ex-
tinction. Even without solving the equation (3), it is clear
that any timescale—including that of extinction—will be
proportional to Λ(N).
It turns out many variations on the basic Moran model,
including the utterance selection model, are adequately
described by (3) with an appropriate definition of the vari-
ant frequency x and characteristic timescale Λ(N). The
earliest such model, introduced independently by Fisher
[65] and Wright [66], predates the Moran model by around
20 years, and describes changes in gene frequencies for
species where generations do not overlap. Since in this
case N replication events occur concurrently, the char-
acteristic timescale is Λ(N) = 2N (i.e., order N shorter
than in the Moran model, where replication events occur
one-by-one). When individuals are placed on the sites of
a square lattice, and speaker-listener pairs are restricted
to neighbouring sites of the lattice, we obtain the voter
model [67] (although it was not actually referred to as
such until a later work [68]). When the number of spatial
dimensions exceeds two, the Fokker-Planck equation ade-
quately describes the dynamics of the total fraction of sites
x in state A, and the characteristic timescale Λ(N) ∼ N2
as in the spatially unstructured case. In two dimensions,
we also have (3), but where now Λ(N) is proportional to
N2 ln(N). On small-diameter networks, one yet again ob-
tains (3), but here the characteristic timescale Λ(N) may
scale with an exponent that depends on the network’s de-
gree distribution and the procedure for choosing a speaker
and listener in each interaction [69–73]. In this case, it
is also necessary to replace x with a weighted average
of a variant’s frequency over the nodes of the network.
These general results apply both in the case where speak-
ers can exhibit only categorical behaviour (as in the orig-
inal Moran model) but also variable behaviour (as in the
utterance selection model).
The relationship between the speech community sizeN
and the characteristic timescale Λ(N) has proven crucial
in evaluating descriptive theories of language change. For
example, it was argued that a process of accommodation—
whereby speakers seek to align their behaviour to each
other in order to be better understood [58]—was sufficient
to explain the structure of new English language dialects
[74]. Whilst this is true of the final state of the language
that is reached in the Moran and utterance selection mod-
els, the slow diffusion towards fixation is difficult to rec-
oncile with the rapid rate at which such dialects are seen
to form [55].
4.2.2 Biased replication in language use
The Moran model demonstrates that replication alone can
deliver consensus within a speech community in the ab-
sence of any other processes. However, it does so on a slow
diffusive timescale. Biases in the dynamics, in production
or perception, can serve to accelerate the consensus for-
mation process in addition to a wide variety of other ef-
fects. One type of bias is a systematic bias in favour of
one variant over another, that is replicator selection. It
is also possible for replication to be biased even when all
variants are treated equally. The naming game provides
one such example. Consider the successful interaction in
Figure 3: the sole word remaining after the interaction is
the one that was in the majority across the two speakers’
inventories. Thus this model features a highly nonlinear
regularisation bias that boosts the frequency of a variant
that has a local majority.
This type of bias, which is experimentally attested (as
will be seen in Section 5 below) can be incorporated into
the Moran model in a systematic way as follows. The idea
is to note that in the original Moran model, the proba-
bility, f(x), that an agent using variant A is chosen as
the speaker is equal to the frequency, x, of that variant.
We can bias the selection of the speaker in favour of users
of the majority variant by choosing f(x) = x + αb(x) in
such a way that b(x) > 0 when x > 12 and b(x) < 0 when
x < 12 . If the variants are otherwise interchangeable, we
must have b(x) = −b(1− x). Moreover, if we do not allow
re-introduction of extinct variants, we must furthermore
have b(0) = b(1) = 0. The lowest order polynomial with
these properties is b(x) = x(1− x)(2x− 1). In the regime
where the bias is small, it contributes a drift term to the
Fokker-Planck equation (3) but leaves the diffusion term
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unchanged. The resulting Fokker-Planck equation can be
written as a Langevin equation
x˙(t) = αx(1− x)(2x− 1) +
√
x(1− x)η(t) (4)
where η(t) is a Gaussian white noise with zero mean and
variance 1/Λ(N), and the multiplicative noise is inter-
preted in the Ito sense [63,75]. In this expression, α is
the strength of the regularisation bias.
The idea of biasing the choice of speaker in this way is
not particularly natural. However, similar equations arise
when one considers the late-time regime of the naming
game in which only two names remain. Agents in this
model exhibit three states (knowledge of A, of B and of
both A and B), and one finds a set of nonlinear differen-
tial equations governing their dynamics in the determin-
istic limit [76]. A simple-minded dimensional reduction
approach, which tracks the frequency of word A across all
inventories (whether alone or alongside B), yields to low-
est order in x an equation of the form (4) [77]. The pres-
ence of this deterministic bias towards the majority vari-
ant leads to much faster extinction of the minority vari-
ant than when relying on the multiplicative noise alone.
Numerical analysis of the full naming game dynamics [59]
shows that consensus is reached on a timescale of O(N3/2)
interactions. Moreover, on this timescale, the transition to
the state of consensus becomes sharper as N is increased,
suggestive of something like a first-order dynamical phase
transition. As in the Moran model, the network topology
can affect the rate of consensus formation. For example
on d-dimensional lattices the ordering timescale scales as
N1+2/d for d ≤ 4 [60], which for d < 2 is the same order-
ing timescale as in the Moran model. For d > 2, ordering
in the naming game is faster, and on small-diameter net-
works one typically obtains the same behaviour as the in
the case of d > 4 and homogeneously-mixing populations,
where the ordering timescale scales as N3/2 interactions
[61].
Even more subtle effects arise when a regularisation
bias interact with other dynamical processes. An in-depth
study of three-state models in the naming-game class,
combined with population turnover that favours state A,
can give rise to a discontinuous transition between con-
sensus on state A, and a phase dominated by state B
[78]. This can be related to a sharp transition between
the tendency for high-frequency verbs to be regular and
low-frequency verbs to be irregular. (Note here that this
regularisation process is distinct from that which serves
to eliminate a minority variant, which is referred to as
‘regularisation of variation’ by linguists).
Another example of a subtle interaction occurs when
regularisation of variation is incorporated into the multi-
speaker utterance selection model. Since a population in
the Moran model becomes a speaker in the utterance
selection model, the bias corresponds to speakers over-
producing the variant that is in the majority in their mem-
ory. If these speakers are placed on a square latter, we
obtain the set of Langevin equations
x˙i(t) =
∑
j
hij(xj − xi) + αxi(1− xi)(2x1 − 1)
+
√
xi(1− xi)ηi(t) (5)
where xi is the frequency of variant A in speaker i’s mem-
ory, hij specifies the extent to which speaker i’s memory
is affected by the tokens produced by their neighbours j
(see Figure 2), and {ηi(t)} is a set of independent Gaus-
sian white noise terms. We can recognise the first term
as a discretised Laplacian operator, and hence this term
describes a spatial diffusion.
In this model, the strength of the Gaussian noise de-
creases as the size of the store N is increased. Thus for
large N , one expects the noise to act as a weak pertur-
bation on the deterministic part of the dynamics, which
in turn is closely related to the Ginzburg-Landau model
of coarsening in the Ising model with nonconserved order
parameter. Indeed, Ising-like coarsening is observed at low
noise strengths (at least on square lattices [79]). However,
for small N , the multiplicative nature of the noise acts as
a strong perturbation on the dynamics to the extent that
it in fact changes the universal properties of the coarsen-
ing dynamics from that of the Ising model to that of the
voter model [79]. In more concrete terms, this means that
when memory is short, speakers tend to exhibit categor-
ical behaviour (because the strong noise tends to cause
extinction at the level of individual speakers), and regions
where speakers exhibit similar behaviour grow logarithmi-
cally in time. On the other hand, when memory is long,
speakers exhibit variable behaviour and regions of similar
behaviour grow as a power-law in time.
Based on this result, we might speculate that for
generic biases we expect there to be two regimes, one in
which the noise serves to eliminate the bias and the phe-
nomenology of the voter model is recovered, and one in
which the noise is sufficiently weak that the deterministic
limit of (5) can be used to gain insights into the fate of
variation under different types of bias. This latter regime
was investigated systematically in [56] by appealing to the
different symmetry principles the biases may have. Asym-
metry may arise separately in the coupling between speak-
ers in (5), that is when the parameters hij in (5) satisfy
hij 6= hji, or in the form of the bias function b(x), for ex-
ample by taking b(x) = x(1−x) which consistently favours
variant A. These correspond to implementing interactor
selection and replicator selection separately. It is found
that only the latter asymmetry provides a robust mecha-
nism for reproducing the widely-observed S-curve pattern
of language change, whereby the overall frequency of an
innovation in the speech community tends to track a sig-
moidal shape (such as a logistic function) as it propagates
and establishes itself as a new convention [56]. It is this
kind of bias that can transform variation at the level of
individual speakers, and translate it into a change in the
macroscopic state of the language which was the funda-
mental dynamical process modelled at the topmost level
of the hierarchy (see Section 2). However, this model of
language change remains incomplete. For the propagation
mechanism to work, the majority of speakers in the speech
community must consistently favour one of the variants
(e.g., A) over the other. Why this should be the case is
difficult to explain without more detailed understanding of
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the origin and the nature of biases on linguistic behaviour,
which we discuss in more detail in Section 5 below.
Another—perhaps more fundamental—puzzle with a
model like that defined by (5) is how to achieve stabil-
ity of multiple dialects within a single speech community.
This is related to the problem of obtaining stable coexis-
tence between two languages discussed in Section 3, and
the reasons are in fact somewhat similar. Suppose that
the bias in (5) is such that for some group of neighbour-
ing individuals, the state of consensus (where all xi = 1
or all xi = 0 within this group) is stable. Then, if bi-
ases are uniform across the speech community, the state
of global consensus will be stable. On way to achieve (at
least metastable) coexistence of both variants across dif-
ferent members of the speech community is if the biases
vary from one place to another, i.e., if one subset of indi-
viduals systematically boosts the frequency of one variant
while another subset systematically boosts the frequency
of the other variant. This is analogous to one of the pro-
posed mechanisms for achieving coexistence of different
languages. However, such an explanation simply moves the
goalposts: although we no longer have to explain where
different language behaviour comes from, we must now
explain how (much less tangible) differences in attitudes
towards language behaviour come from, and how these be-
come to be correlated with different regions in space. Stud-
ies in the area of opinion dynamics [8] suggest one possible
resolution of this difficulty in a self-consistent way, which
is to incorporate a feedback whereby agents preferentially
interact with those agents who behave in a similar way to
themselves. Separation into groups that exhibit their own
distinctive behaviour is seen in three classes of model that
implement this idea: Brownian agents that diffuse towards
regions of similar opinion [80], Deffuant-type models of
bounded confidence [81], in which agents whose opinions
differ by more than a certain amount have no effect on
each other, and the Axelrod model [82] and derivatives, in
which agents exhibit multiple variable traits and the prob-
ability a pair of agents interacts depends on how many
traits they have in common. In the language of Croft el al
[53,55,56], this corresponds to a feedback between repli-
cator and interactor selection.
4.2.3 Biased replication in language learning
In the foregoing, we have mostly considered biases that
apply at instances of language use. The effects of biases
in language learning have been the focus of a consider-
able body of modelling work in the linguistics community,
most notably within the framework of the iterated learn-
ing model [83,84]. In these models, agents are typically
characterised in terms of a grammar—that is, a set of
rules that governs the sentences they can produce.
The task of an individual in the iterated learning model
is to infer which of a set of grammars to adopt, given the
sentences produced by other (typically more experienced)
members of a speech community. As in the Moran model,
the simplest case is to consider two grammars, A and B.
The dynamics of the iterated learning model are usually
formulated as follows. A na¨ıve agent is exposed to the ut-
terances generated by an experienced agent’s grammar,
and infers a grammar (A or B) based on these utterances.
At this point, they become an experienced agent and then
serve as a model for one (or more) na¨ıve agents to learn
from. We can think of this as a replication process, in that
grammars are replicated from one generation to the next:
however, changes may occur in replication due to the fact
that more than one grammar may be compatible with the
set of utterances that the learner was exposed to. Biases
may be present in production or learning that result in
certain grammars being favoured over others as they are
replicated: these thus mirror the biases discussed above in
the context of language use and the utterance selection
model. Indeed, a more formal connection between the it-
erated learning model and the utterance selection model
was made in the case where a grammar specifies the fre-
quency with which two variant forms should be used. Here
it was shown that if agents employ a Bayesian learning al-
gorithm after hearing N tokens of a variable structure, the
estimated frequency x is governed by the Langevin equa-
tion (4) with a bias that can act either in favour or against
categorical use of a single variant, depending on the prior
expectations of the language learner and the number of
tokens heard [85].
The main purpose of iterated learning models is to
understand processes by which an initially unstructured
language may acquire structure after many generations
of learning. Of particular interest are properties that are
thought to transcend all languages. These design features
[86] include the fact language is productive (i.e., the abil-
ity to articulate a novel thought and be understood by a
listener), exhibits duality of patterning (i.e., that combina-
torial structure exists at both the level of meaningless and
meaningful units) and compositional (i.e., that the mean-
ing of an utterance can be understood from the meanings
of the component parts). It seems likely that these two fea-
tures are related: for example, compositionality provides a
means by which language can be productive. What is less
obvious is that a pressure on speakers to be productive
can promote the emergence of compositional structure.
This effect was demonstrated within an iterated learn-
ing model with the space of grammars defined in such a
way that agents could express a set of structured meanings
(e.g., objects that have a shape and a colour) in either a
holistic way (i.e., with no relation between the structure
of the signal and meaning) or a compositional way (where
the component parts of the meaning can be understood
from the component parts of the signal) [87]. The bias
responsible for the emergence of structure lies in the pro-
duction part of the interaction. The experienced agents
have no control over which meanings they are required
to express when providing training data to na¨ıve agents:
thus if the amount of data that is presented at each gen-
eration is small, agents may be confronted with meanings
for which they have never heard a signal. Under these
conditions, it is found that grammars that allow compo-
nents of signals to be recombined are favoured by iterated
learning. In more abstract terms, one might think of this
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as a competition between minimising the number of dis-
tinct signals in the grammar and maximising the ability
to convey arbitrarily complex meanings. Such a competi-
tion may perhaps be related to guiding principles, such as
the principle of least effort [88] and the principle of uni-
form information density [89], which could potentially be
investigated within this modelling framework. Meanwhile,
it is worth noting that the grammars that feature in these
models remain very simple, far away from the complexity
of full-blown languages.
4.2.4 Innovation
The modelling of replication dynamics is greatly simpli-
fied if one knows in advance all possible variants of linguis-
tic structure that may come into existence as the system
evolves. Then, the state space is of fixed dimension, and
one can (for example) extend the Moran model and its
relatives to a larger number variants. Indeed, the multi-
variant generalisation of (3) is exactly solvable if the rate
at which an agent spontaneously innovates a given variant
Ai is independent of the state of the system [90]. Techni-
cally, this is because there is no current in the steady state:
at some level, the dynamics fall into the same class as that
of physical systems at thermal equilibrium. All other mod-
els of innovation generate nonequilibrium steady states,
and we are not aware of any exact solutions for the multi-
variant Moran model in this case.
The situation is even more complex when arbitrarily
many variants can be created, as is the case for language,
given its design feature of productivity. If one augments
the Moran model with an innovation process that gen-
erates completely new variants at a constant rate, one
arrives at the infinite-alleles model in population genet-
ics for which some exact results are available [91,92]. By
contrast, the full stochastic dynamics of models like the
naming game, in which innovation is incorporated in a
concrete and natural way, are resistant to analytical so-
lution, and have therefore mostly been studied by direct
Monte Carlo simulation.
From an empirical perspective, the most interesting
application of a model in this class is to understand uni-
versal properties of colour terms. Languages differ in the
number of basic colour terms (like ‘red’ or ‘green’ in En-
glish) that exist, and also in the shades that are regarded
prototypical of a specific colour term [93]. Nevertheless,
the division of the continuous colour space into discrete
categories is not completely arbitrary: in particular, the
prototypes for each category (eg red, blue and green) form
clusters in colour space that do not strongly overlap [93,
94]. Baronchelli et al [95] used an extension to the naming
game to explain this phenomenon. The basic idea is that
speakers are presented with multiple colours in a single
scene, and seek to refer to a specific target colour. If the
speaker’s categorisation of the (one-dimensional) colour
space is such that the target is the sole member of its cat-
egory in the scene, a word associated with this category is
presented to the listener. Otherwise, the speaker creates
a new category (and a new word for it) that is sufficient
to disambiguate the target from the other colours present.
The interaction is successful if the listener recognises the
word, and manages to correctly infer the target meaning
(either because it is unambiguous according to the lis-
tener’s categorisation, or because they guessed correctly
among equally plausible alternatives). Addition and dele-
tion of words than proceeds as in the naming game: in the
case of failed communication, the speaker indicates the
target meaning and the listener adds the uttered word to
the category containing that meaning. Na¨ıvely one might
expect these dynamics to lead to a very fine partitioning
of colour space so that any combination of stimuli can
be disambiguated. However, this is not the case for two
reasons. First, only a small number of colours are typi-
cally shown in a scene, so the distance between them will
typically be large. Second, speakers and listeners need to
have well-aligned category boundaries for communication
to be successful. Such alignment is hard to achieve with
a large number of boundaries, and the failed interactions
will tend to lead to words spreading between categories.
Consequently, there is a trade-off between the ability to
express distinctions between different colours and the dif-
ficulty of aligning a highly complex category system, rem-
iniscent of the trade-offs seen in iterated learning mod-
els discussed above. The question of how category pro-
totypes (which can be defined as the midpoint between
two category boundaries) cluster around universal points
was investigated by incorporating the psychological no-
tion of a just noticeable difference (JND) into the model.
In the context of colour, this means that any two stim-
uli presented in the same scene differ in wavelength by
an amount that exceeds some small value (otherwise the
agent would not be able to distinguish them). Empiri-
cal research shows that the JND varies with wavelength:
some nearby colours are easier for humans in all cultures
to distinguish than others [96]. Consequently, this breaks
the translational symmetry in colour space, and generates
clustering that is argued to be consistent with that found
empirically [95]. Models of this type have also been used
to demonstrate the emergence of language design features
(recall Section 4.2.3), such as duality of patterning [97].
5 Individual linguistic interactions
Much of the modelling work described in the previous sec-
tion is of a theoretical nature, aimed at understanding
how processes of different types acting in the individual
level shape the process of arriving at a shared linguistic
conventions. In some cases contact with empirical data
has been possible, for example the emergence of colour
terms [95], new-dialect formation [55] and verb regulari-
sation [78]. It is however the case that historical data for
language changes and other factors that might affect the
process of change, such as social network structures, is
relatively sparse (in comparison, for example, to data for
financial transactions), thereby limiting the number of op-
portunities to apply models to real instances of language
change. On the other hand, the last few years has seen
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a rapid growth in experimental research on human com-
municative and linguistic interactions (see [98] for a recent
review). Although these laboratory-based experiments are
necessarily limited to small numbers of participants and
short timescales, they provide valuable information about
biases affecting individual linguistic behaviour. They also
also illustrate some of the considerable complexity that is
evident in human communication.
With this in mind, it is first worth considering how
a communicative act would appear to alien with limited
communicative capabilities (or perhaps a domestic cat).
What they would observe is people using their lungs and
mouths to create pressure waves in the air, perhaps also
moving their arms around at the same time, along with
other movements like blinking, scratching of heads and
so on. What would it take for the alien to realise that
these actions have a communicative intent? This ques-
tion has been addressed through experiments involving
robots [99] and humans [100] that demonstrate processes
by which communication channels are created on-the-fly
through interactions without prespecifying that commu-
nication is desirable or providing an obvious way to do so.
In the case of humans, the crucial step that the agents
make is to perform behaviour that is unexpected from
other agents’ perspectives. This allows these agents to in-
fer that the behaviour may be communicative [100]. This
process requires complex cognitive abilities—for example
the ability to predict how another agent will respond to
an action—and as such is argued to be specific to humans
[101].
Given this understanding of how agents are able to
identify certain behaviours as potential signals, the ques-
tion now arises as to how they would associate a signal
with a specific meaning. Here it is worth remarking that in
almost all models discussed above in Section 4, the mean-
ing of a signal was always assumed to be known to both
agents in a communicative interaction. For example, in
the case of the colour terms study [95], any ambiguity in
the meaning of a word was always resolved after an inter-
action as the speaker “unveils the topic [target meaning]
via pointing” [95, SI:p2]. If it is always possible to com-
municate a word’s meaning by nonlinguistic means, then
language is surely redundant. This suggests that there is
likely always to be some some ambiguity in any utter-
ance, particularly in the process of language acquisition
where children somehow infer the meanings of words (and
more generally grammatical constructions) from experi-
enced language users.
There is a considerable body of experimental research
that addresses this problem (see e.g. [102] for a review
of early contributions in this area). Much of this work
is conducted in an artificial language learning paradigm,
whereby experimental participants are presented with a
series of scenes containing a number of potential referents
of a word (or set of words) and are asked questions that de-
termine the inferences that participants have drawn about
the meanings of words they have heard. The working hy-
pothesis that has emerged is that a number of processes
combine to deliver reliable word learning. First, on hear-
ing an unfamiliar word, learners apply various heuristics
to narrow down the (potentially infinite) set of possi-
ble meanings to a more manageable number of candidate
meanings [102]. Experimentally attested heuristics include
following the gaze of the speaker [103], an expectation that
a word is more likely to relate to a whole object rather
than one of its parts [104], or that no two words have the
same meaning [105]. In some cases, these heuristics are
able to eliminate all uncertainty and the word is learnt
immediately. This effect is known as fast mapping [106].
However, it seems plausible that this is not always possi-
ble, and that language learners integrate information from
multiple exposures to resolve any ambiguity. For example,
if a child first encounters the word “sheep” on a visit to a
farm, they could assume from the context that this refers
to a cow that is also physically present; it is only on a later
encounter that the cow meaning is implausible, whereas
the sheep meaning is highly plausible, and the child revises
their internal lexicon accordingly.
The general practice of combining information from
multiple exposures is referred to as cross-situational learn-
ing [107], and the separate process of hypothesising a
(possibly incorrect) meaning and awaiting confirmation
from later exposures is referred to variably as a guess-
and-test [108] or propose-and-verify [109] heuristic. Both
processes—along with a variety of others—been observed
in artificial language learning experiments, which have
been conducted variously with children and adults [108,
110,109]. These results have inspired mathematical mod-
els of word learning which show that a lexicon of the size of
that typically acquired by an adult human (60,000 words
[102]) can be learnt on a realistic timescale under quite
general conditions [111,112]. It is even in principle possi-
ble to learn the meaning of a word when an infinite set of
alternative meanings can be inferred at any given expo-
sure, as long as a learner can assign a plausibility rank-
ing in such a way that the kth most plausible meaning
decays as a power-law k−σ with some positive exponent
σ [113]. The main challenge faced by a cross-situational
learner is when a nontarget meaning of a word is almost
always as plausible as the target meaning. In this situ-
ation, the much-discussed mutual exclusivity constraint
[105], whereby no two words are expected to have a com-
mon meaning, can greatly facilitate the process of iden-
tifying the correct meaning (as long as the plausible but
incorrect meaning has an associated word) [114].
A small but significant (and somewhat ingenious) ex-
tension to the artificial language learning paradigm al-
lows the emergence of structure that was previously seen
in computational implementations of the iterated learn-
ing model (see Section 4.2.3) to be replicated with real
human participants. The idea is that the first participant
learns a language that exhibits no systematic structure:
for example, a random combination of syllables for a set
of objects that occupy a structured meaning space (e.g.,
have various shape and colour combinations). After train-
ing, the participant is asked to name a set of objects (some
of which they may not have seen before). The twist is that
the answers that are provided in testing are then used as
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the training data for the next participant. This process
can then be iterated to see how the language evolves as
a consequence of repeated learning and production. The
first experiment of this type [115] confirmed the predic-
tions of the earlier computer simulations [87], namely that
the communication system acquires a systematic composi-
tional structure over multiple generations of learning. This
experiment further provides evidence for a competition
between maximising the number of distinctions between
meanings and minimising the complexity of the language
that was alluded to above. This was seen by comparing two
conditions, one in which participants could be exposed to
a language where the same signal had multiple meanings,
and one in which a filter was installed to prevent this from
occurring. If the former case, the language became simpler
by becoming less expressive; in the latter, the language re-
tained its expressivity by becoming more structured.
Variations on this experimental approach have been
used to explore other topics that were discussed in Sec-
tions 4. Although inspired by experiments with robotic
agents, the naming game has also been realised with hu-
man participants [116]. Here the interest is in the role of
the network topology that specifies which pairs of partici-
pants may interact, a subject that has been of great inter-
est in the statistical physics community (see Section 4 and
[8]). This experiment demonstrated that consensus forma-
tion is accelerated in homogeneously mixing populations
relative to spatial or random networks, as predicted by
theoretical models [60,61].
Other experiments have examined the role that biases
may play in changing the way in which the frequency of
different variants change over time. One set of experiments
centres around a graphical communication task reminis-
cent of the game Pictionary [117], and has certain similar-
ities to the naming game. Here, participants are provided
with a predefined set of meanings and are asked to draw
a picture to communicate one of them to another partic-
ipant who has to identify the correct meaning. The set
of meanings is deliberately constructed to contain items
that are hard to differentiate graphically (e.g., ‘drama’ and
‘soap opera’). In one such experiment [117], pairs of par-
ticipants work through the set of meanings, thereby con-
structing their own individual symbols for the means. The
participants are then grouped into new pairs, and asked
to communicate the same set of meanings. A key question
is what happens when two players who have established
different symbols for the same meaning meet. Tamariz et
al [118] consider two biases that might affect whether a
participant keeps their existing symbol or switches to the
other player’s symbol after an interaction. The first is a co-
ordination bias, which is a bias towards or against adopt-
ing symbols produced by other players. The second is a
content bias, which is a bias towards specific symbols (e.g.,
because they communicated the intended meaning more
effectively than others). These two biases are instances of
interactor and replicator selection in the language of [55,
56]. The main findings were that players tended to be bi-
ased in favour of keeping their existing signals, but that
evidence of content bias was present in most cases. It is in-
teresting to note that these two effects are in conflict with
each other: content bias promotes change, but agents are
generally resistant to modifying their behaviour.
In the graphical communication experiment, agents are
well characterised by usage of one particular signals for a
given meaning. Since language users can be variable in lan-
guage use, it is of interest to learn what happens to this
variability when these users interact. In particular, this
may provide some information as to the appropriate bias
to include in an equation like Eq. (4) which models vari-
able language behaviour. Again, iterated learning experi-
ments can be applied to this problem. Reali and Griffiths
[119] set up a language where each object has two names
which appear with prescribed frequencies against their
target meaning. After training, a participant is asked to
name each object several times, which provides a set of fre-
quencies to use for the next generation of learning. In this
approach, one can build up a transition matrix T (x′|x),
which gives the probability that when word A is used with
frequency x to name an object, that after learning an in-
dividual uses that word with frequency x′. Reali and Grif-
fiths find that in one generation of learning, learners ap-
pear to probability match, i.e., that x¯′ =
∑
x′ T (x
′|x) ≈ x.
However, considerable variation is evident, and over multi-
ple generations of learning the frequency distribution that
results is consistent with a weak bias against variability
(i.e., one that favours frequencies close to 0 or 1). This
is consistent with sociolinguistic understanding of varia-
tion, which is that where variation exists, it is usually
conditioned on a linguistic factor (e.g., the pronunciation
of a sound may depend on the position in the word) or
a social factor (e.g., the speaker’s age, level of education
or other aspect of their identity) [9,54]. A further iter-
ated learning experiment [120] bears this out, wherein the
initial language had consistent names for each of the ob-
jects, but two different plural markers. Although initially
one plural marker is more frequent than the other, there
is no correlation between which plural marking is used for
which object. Here it is found that iterated learning either
eliminates one of the plural markers, or that the variation
becomes predictable: that is, each object is typically plu-
ralised by one or other of the markers, but not both.
A final application of the artificial language learning
paradigm is to investigate whether the nonuniform distri-
bution of a structural feature over the world’s languages
(like word order, see Section 2) predicts the existence of
a bias towards the more frequent structures in single in-
stances of learning. One such study relates to affixes that
change the meaning of the word. Where this occurs, it
turns out that suffixes are more common than prefixes or
infixes [121]. To investigate whether this is also true at
the individual level, St Clair et al [122] trained partici-
pants on an artificial language in which words are divided
into two categories, each with their own affix. When pre-
sented with unfamiliar sentences, participants could more
reliably identify when the correct affix was used for a par-
ticular word stem, in correspondence with the observation
that suffixes are more common than prefixes.
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As noted in Section 2, correlations between two struc-
tural features of a language have been observed, and are
formulated as implicational universals. Culbertson et al
[123] set up an experiment to determine whether a corre-
lation between the order of numerals and nouns and the
order of adjectives and nouns is visible at the level of indi-
vidual learning events. In particular, one of the four pos-
sible orderings is much less frequent than the other three.
Participants were trained on four variant languages, and
then asked to describe a set of scenes using the language
they had learnt. Points were awarded for a valid descrip-
tion of the scene (i.e., the right words, but in any order)
and additionally if the order matched that of a computer-
generated ‘native’ speaker of the artificial language. The
input languages were set up in such a way that partici-
pants would score maximum points by using one of the
four possible orderings exclusively. The results of this ex-
periment showed that this happened for all four input lan-
guages, apart from the one that corresponds to the order-
ing that is rare across the world’s languages. Again, this
suggests that the nonuniform distribution over structures
in the worlds’ languages originates in biases that act at
the level of single instances of language acquisition or use.
6 Unifying and extending the hierarchy
In this Colloquium I have surveyed four levels in a hier-
archy of scales along a social dimension that is relevant
to language dynamics. One way to classify these levels is
according to the main unit of variation at that level. This
then determines the range of phenomena that are available
for investigation: see Table 1. Here, we have taken indi-
vidual episodes of language acquisition and production to
sit at the base of the hierarchy. These episodes typically
involve a small number of language users (often just two)
interacting for a short period of time (typically minutes).
These length- and timescales are sufficiently small that
laboratory experiments involving human participants—
and the full complexity of their cognitive apparatus—can
be used to measure biases that govern how language learn-
ing and production affects the structure and variability of
language (see Section 5). With knowledge of these biases,
we can then build effective models of individual human
behaviour, and embed these individuals in a speech com-
munity, as described in Section 4. Through repeated inter-
actions, language structure may emerge, and one that can
characterise an entire speech community. At higher levels
of the hierarchy, both speech communities and languages
are taken as coherent units. In the former case this leads to
competition between languages, as described in Section 3,
and in the latter, languages differentiate over time giving
rise to a tree-like structure of relationships between them
(Section 2).
The choice as to where to begin and end the hierar-
chy is entirely arbitrary, and an artifact of a constraint
on the overall length of this article. At the bottom of the
hierarchy, one could, for example, delve deeper into the
workings of the human brain, and take the various cog-
nitive capacities associated with language as the unit of
Unit of variation Locus of enquiry
Language a shared system Phylogenetic relationships
between languages
Speech community associ-
ated with a language
Language competi-
tion, birth, death and
coexistence
Individuals within a speech
community
Emergence of shared
conventions and mainte-
nance of variation between
subcommunities
Episodes of acquisition and
production
Biases that favour one lin-
guistic variant over an-
other
Table 1. Hierarchy of scales in language dynamics along the
social dimension covered in this article ordered by decreasing
length- and timescales
variation. At the other end, we could extend to biological
timescales, whereby these cognitive capacities are subject
to biological evolution, and there is potential for an in-
teraction between the cultural and biological evolutionary
processes.
In principle, one could integrate the different levels
of the hierarchy into a single whole, and the discussion
we have given provides some detail as to how this might
be achieved in practice. First, from the experiments de-
scribed in Section 5, we described how one can build up
a transition matrix T (x′|x) that specifies how individu-
als modify the frequency x that they exhibit a specific
behaviour in single interactions. This transition rate ma-
trix could then be incorporated into the update rules of
a Moran-type model (Section 4.1.1), which would lead
to a set of stochastic equations of motion analogous to
Eq. (5), where the deterministic biases can be traced
back to the experimentally-determined transition matrix
T (x′|x). From here, one can predict the structures that be-
come established as conventions in a speech community,
and by further augmenting individuals in the model with
their own birth-death dynamics we can study the com-
petition between languages with different structures that
occurs at the level of the speech community (Section 3).
If one coarse-grains over individual variability and looks
for a deterministic limit, it seems likely that a descrip-
tion similar to that postulated by Abrams and Strogatz,
Eq. (2), will result. If one further coarse-grains over the
number of speakers, and looks at the conventions that are
formed over longer timescales, then an effective dynamics
for changes in these structures—for example, the Poisson
process (1) that has been used in the phylogenetic analy-
ses of Section 2—would result.
Although it is technically possible to connect the levels
of the hierarchy in this way, is there any intellectual value
in doing so? After all, when studying the relationships
that emerge between languages at the largest length- and
timescales, one may not be too interested in the precise
process by which a new convention becomes established,
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just how this may be adequately described at the relevant
timescales. A Poisson process could provide the adequacy
that is desired. However, in addressing this question it is
worth looking more deeply into the some of the under-
lying motivations for research questions that have been
posed at opposite ends of the hierarchy. For example, in
their study of word-order universals at the level of en-
tire languages, Maurits and Griffiths [35] make reference
to underlying psychological biases that act in favour of
one word order (e.g., burdens on working memory) and
how one would then expect these to be reflected in a pre-
ferred direction of change at the macroscopic level. Mean-
while, Culbertson et al [123] in their experimental study
of changes in word order that occur at the level of an indi-
vidual refer to the hypothesis that “if a logically-possible
grammatical system is not found, or is quite rate cross-
linguistically, the explanation offered by [theories based
on biases in learning] is that this system violates a learn-
ing bias” [123, p306]. It is reassuring that the results of
both investigations point in a similar direction, in that less
common word orders appear to be less stable both at the
level of individual learning and at the level of historical
change. However, to demonstrate that these are manifes-
tations of the same phenomenon requires us to connect
the two descriptions via the intermediate levels of the hi-
erarchy. If this is achieved, one would gain deeper insights
into which aspects of human cognition are most relevant
to the process of cultural evolution, which in turn could
help us understand how these cognitive abilities arose in
the course of human evolution.
Two sources of complexity make such a unification
challenging. First, many factors can affect language dy-
namics at each level of the hierarchy. By way of illustra-
tion, suppose that transmission matrices between linguis-
tic states for single individuals have been established in
an experimental setting, and are understood to charac-
terise all human beings. On plugging these into speech-
community-level models, it is clear from Section 4 that
changes in state at the level of the common language
that emerges can depend on specific (nonlinguistic) fea-
tures of those communities. For example, the characteris-
tic timescales in the Moran model (denoted by the func-
tion Λ(N) in Eq. (3)) and in the naming game—and there-
fore likely most other models—vary with the speech com-
munity size N in a way that depends on how the social
network is connected, and the relative influence that dif-
ferent speakers can have on each other. At the same time,
the propagation of a minority variant seems to require a
positive disposition (replicator selection bias) towards it
on the part of a majority of speakers [56]. Such dispo-
sition towards a particular way of speaking presumably
varies from one speech community to another and within
a single community over time, for example due to its as-
sociation with a particular well-regarded group of individ-
uals [53]. Thus it would in fact be somewhat surprising if
the transition rates that apply at the macroscopic level,
as in Eq. (1), were universal for a given structural fea-
ture in space and time, unless perhaps all the changes
that occur at the lower levels of the hierarchy on such
a fast timescale that they give the appearance of being
so. Indeed, some studies [37,34,32] provide evidence that
language structure and the rate of language change covary
with culture-specific factors.
The second source of complexity is one that we have
barely touched on in this work, namely that human lan-
guage is a highly complex object, with many different com-
ponents (sounds, words, grammar), which presumably in-
teract with each other in acquisition and use. Many mod-
els, empirical analyses and experiments on the dynamics
of language tend to employ fairly simple notions of lan-
guage structure, for example, use of one of a number of
variants of a single linguistic feature at the level of the lan-
guage (as in Section 2) or individual speakers (as in Sec-
tions 3–5). By contrast, investigations of the properties of
a language (or across languages) at a single point in time
are somewhat more sophisticated, and demonstrate the
existence of a wide variety of statistical regularities, such
as power-law word frequency distributions and long-range
correlations in written texts [124], or universal properties
of the semantic relationships between words in different
languages [125]. At present, the origin of such phenom-
ena remain to be understood within an emergentist frame-
work: for example, the relative contributions from human
cognition and social interactions in shaping these struc-
tures is not yet clear. Lying beyond such properties are
more general design features, such as the ability for lan-
guage to satisfy the productive needs of a speaker whilst
remaining intelligible to a listener, which can only be un-
derstood if one moves outside frameworks in which the
set of meanings and signals that can be communicated,
and the structural relationships that exist between their
components, are not artificially limited.
In summary, future advances in understanding lan-
guage dynamics requires simultaneous progress on at least
three fronts. First, a more complete mathematical under-
standing of what specific models predict would be valu-
able. For example, the exact solutions of the simplest
Moran models and their variants have provided a great
deal of insight into evolutionary dynamics in general [91];
however, these solutions are known only for the case where
currents vanish in the steady state. Thus, as in physics,
the more general case of athermal (entropy-producing) dy-
namics is the one that is both of greater applicability,
but presents a correspondingly more difficult mathemat-
ical challenge. Meanwhile, more complex dynamical pro-
cesses are typically implemented as computational models.
Again, it is typically difficult to access realistic degrees of
complexity (e.g., in speech community size, or structure of
the linguistic system) in cases where the stationary state
is not an equilibrium (zero-current) case, as the most effi-
cient simulation algorithms tend to rely on this property.
Second, as this and other reviews (e.g., [8,84]) attest,
there is a profusion of models of language dynamics (and
related processes like opinion formation). At the same
time, many distinct models show broadly similar results,
for example, a tendency towards consensus unless there
is a pre-existing spatial symmetry breaking or a feedback
between agent behaviour and the propensity to interact;
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or that structure tends to emerge over repeated learning.
The statistical physics community in particular is yet to
converge on a core set of models that achieve the optimal
balance between (analytical or computational) tractabil-
ity and explanatory power. It is also important to con-
solidate the various modelling approaches that have been
taken into a set of general principles. A number of works
hint for example at principles that involve trade-offs be-
tween the expressive power and complexity of a language
system, which are broadly reminiscent of the trade-offs
between energy and entropy that provide a deep under-
standing of collective phenomena in physical systems.
Finally, it is a truth almost universally acknowledged
that data for language behaviour over the course of human
history is scarce. Although the World Atlas of Language
Structures [21] is extensive in terms of the number of lan-
guages and structures that it covers, and augmented by
companion databases such as the Atlas of Pidgin and Cre-
ole Language Structures [51], these document languages
at only one point in time. This allows historical changes
to be inferred, but validating these inferences by compar-
ing with the actual changes that have occurred is diffi-
cult. These difficulties are further confounded if it turns
out that additional factors (such as the speech community
size or social network structure) also affect historical lan-
guage dynamics, since then these will need to be known as
well. This highlights the need for good-quality data sets
that track language use and social structures over time.
An obvious source of such data, if one is specifically in-
terested in how linguistic behaviour spreads and changes
over short timescales, may be derived from social media. In
particular, it may be possible to determine whether mod-
els of the type described in Section 4 adequately describe
how innovations propagate through an online community.
Other large-scale sources of data with greater time depth
also exist, such as Google’s corpus of scanned books [126].
Alongside providing snapshots of language use, the online
world also offers the opportunity for mass behavioural ex-
periments. Many of experimental designs outlined in Sec-
tion 5 lend themselves to being set as tasks on platforms
like the Amazon Mechanical Turk, and their results have
been found to correlate well with traditional experiments
(see e.g. [127]). Scientific progress is greatly accelerated
when data is abundant, and with some creative thinking,
data-driven advances in language modelling may pave the
way to a more complete understanding of processes that
lie beyond the grasp of empirical research.
I think Bill Croft for introducing me to this fascinating topic,
and Simon Kirby, Andrew Smith and Kenny Smith for their
ability to explain linguistics in a way that a physicist can un-
derstand.
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